Intra-European migration
Migration policies at origin Return migration Romanian migration Youth return migration During the last decades, the interest in migration policies has increased, both at institutional level and in academia. However, if the scientific understanding of policies associated with migration at destination has tremendously advanced, our knowledge about origin countries interventions in migration stays limited. Our paper addresses one of the largely unexplored topic of this area: if and what kind of policies supporting return/returnees the returnees themselves find appropriate. The analysis is based on 120 interviews with Romanian returnees, aged 18 to 39, coming back after at least 6 months of working or studying abroad in different EU countries. The article reveals that even if the return policies are generally positively evaluated by the Romanian returned migrants, not all of them support the idea of having policies specially designed for attracting migrants back to the origin country. Some of them simply reject the idea and others are sceptical about the state capacity of implementing this type of policies. The paper explores all the main clusters of attitudes towards return migration policies and illustrates each of them with excerpts from in-depth interviews.
Introduction 1
In 1993, when the first edition of "The Age of Migration" was published, its authors, Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller, probably did not anticipate that their inspired title would, a few decades later, become a real label for (at least) the beginning of the twenty-first century. Especially nowadays, migration and its implications are present everywhere in public and academic discourse. In Europe, the rise in the number of asylum seekers has erupted in inflammatory formulas such as "crisis of migration". Brexit and the recent terrorist attacks in major European cities have increased the concern and attention paid to international migration in terms of migratory flows and processes of integration (economic, social and cultural) . International migration has become one of the hot topics of current public debate. While this increased passion may not be the best premise for the study of migration, its merit lies in stimulating research in the field. No one can doubt that the funds available for research have been augmented, and the social sciences are among the favoured beneficiaries. However, research seems unable to liberate itself from the "false universalism" (Burawoy 2016) imposed by the mechanisms of (social) sciences production. It continues to privilege Western societies' mastery (Burawoy 2016) . In migration studies, this is reflected in a prioritisation of topics of interest for receiving countries, or as de Haas & Vezzoli (2011, 2) put it, in "a general receiving-country bias". This bias especially affects the study of migration policies.
Of relatively recent interest for academia (Massey 1999; Hollifield 2008; Hollifield and Wong, 2013) is the role of the state in international migration, which has been mainly analysed from the perspective of the receiving country. Although the need to investigate what happens in the origin country was acknowledged long ago (e.g. Massey 1999) , and there has been progress in this direction, Weinar explains, "While it seems obvious what immigration Social Change Review ▪ Winter 2018 ▪ Vol. 16(1-2): 9-34 policy is, emigration policy represents an enigma" (2014, 5) . Overlooking the exaggeration, the statement accurately stresses the disproportion in the levels of conceptualisation and accumulated knowledge on policies linked to the origin versus the destination areas of migration.
In this context, our paper is a contribution to the process of extending the list of topics investigated in relation to migration policies in countries of origin. In its current form, it does not offer a consistent contribution to theoretical advancement, but rather aims to contribute to the development of new lines of inquiry. Here we do not directly approach the intervention of the state, but rather seek to highlight the opinions that returnees themselves have about return migration policies and about the need for implementing such policies, specifically in the case of one particular emigration country (or labour emigration country, in the terminology used by Østergaard-Nielsen [2003] ). We exclusively use qualitative information (120 interviews with young returnees) collected in one of the most important sending countries of intra-European migration, Romania. We prompted our interviewees to discuss not only the need for such policies in Romania, but also to describe their ideas about the content of such policies. Contrary to our expectations, the state's interventions aimed at return migration/returnees were not entirely supported by our informants (themselves returnees). Some of our interviewees were sceptical about the need for such policies; some rejected the idea. For those who found such policies useful, the content they attributed to them was (consistently) broader than what we were used to finding in the literature describing origin country interventions in the area. Interestingly, regardless of the opinions about which policies were needed, the main factor that seemed to drive the scepticism was a lack of trust in the Romanian authorities and their actions and not, as previous literature has suggested (Tai and Truex 2015) , concerns regarding the increase of social inequality.
This paper is structured in six parts. We begin with a general discussion about return migration policies, mainly aiming to clarify the meaning of the terms used here. We then discuss the few findings that research literature offers in relation to opinions/attitudes of the population of origin countries Social Change Review ▪ Winter 2018 ▪ Vol. 16(1-2): 9-34 towards return migration policies. In the third section of the paper, we place our discussion in a very specific context (i.e. Romania) and briefly describe Romanian migration and the public authorities' involvement in managing it.
We state our case for choosing Romania as a propitious site for studying our topic. The methodology of the study is then presented. The fifth section of the paper is dedicated to results regarding our informants' opinions about the current need for return policies in Romania and the way they conceive such policies. A brief discussion section closes the paper.
Return migration policies and attitudes towards them: a brief introduction to the topic
Even if intuitively return migration policy seems to be a straightforward concept (i.e. interventions related to return migration), in migration studies the meanings are not at all so clear. This is not because scholars in the field of migration studies are not capable of a simple language exercise, but because, in fact, the reality subordinated to the label is complex, volatile and hard to capture.
To date, return migration policies is a term that has been linked to interventions operating from two different spaces 2 : the country of destination (the place to which the migrants have gone to live and from which they now wish to return) and the country of origin (the place to which the migrants wish to return). We will be referring here only to the latter sense. Specifically, we are interested here only in interventions designed and implemented by public authorities in the origin countries. Defining the object of interest so narrowly does not, as it might seem, make our task easier. The reason for doing so is that the interventions related to return do not, to date, constitute, as Koch, referring to destination countries and international organisations, explained, "a policy field in its own right" (Koch 2013, 906, emphasis added) . The consequence is that the references to return migration policies of origin Social Change Review ▪ Winter 2018 ▪ Vol. 16(1-2): 9-34 countries, or rather to measures aimed at regulating/managing the return, are scattered throughout different fields of inquiry, are difficult to identify and are usually described in connection with other different topics (e.g. transnationalism, diaspora, return migration and the migration and development nexus). Moreover, the fluid character of current migration and the different meanings of return, 3 which today cannot be simply assimilated with permanent return but also encompass temporary or circular migration, make things even more complex.
Yet, recently, scholars in migration studies have started to pay attention to the role of origin countries in managing migration (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003; Gamlen 2008; de Haas and Vezzoli 2011; Lesińska 2013; Weinar 2014) , and this also has consequences for conceptualisation in the field of migration policy.
One may not talk yet about a widely accepted definition of origin country migration policies. However, there is a clear tendency towards the common acceptance of migration policies of origin countries as combining at least two components: emigration and diaspora (e.g. de Haas and Vezzoli 2011, Weinar 2014); but sometimes they also include three: emigration, diaspora and return (e.g. Østergaard-Nielsen 2003; Lesińska 2013) 4 . As one may notice, there seems to be a consistent difference in the way return-related interventions are approached. Yet, none of the two positions mentioned above excludes/neglects them: in a two-dimensional perspective, return migration policies are part of emigration policies. We prefer here to use a threedimensional perspective and to consider return migration policies as an independent dimension of the migration policies of origin countries 5 .
Even when accepting one or the other of the two perspectives already mentioned, one important problem still remains for defining the content of such policies. Czaika and De Haas's (2013, 489) solution, which is to define migration policies according to their establishment in order "to affect the 3 See Sinatti (2015) for a discussion about Senegalese migration. 4 The labels used for different components of migration policy at origin differ from one author to another (e.g. Østergaard-Nielsen [2003] speaks in terms of "migration management", "protection of overseas workers" and "return policies"). 5 For arguments see also Șerban (2014) .
Social Change Review ▪ Winter 2018 ▪ Vol. 16(1-2): 9-34 behaviour of a target population" (our emphasis added), only apparently solves the difficulty. Applied to the case of return migration, this is not very helpful, as the interventions directed to return (may) initially be aimed at a population of migrants, not at one of returnees. This is the source of another, relatively frequent, overlap: some interventions that could be linked to return migration are accepted by some authors as part of return migration policies, while the same interventions are considered by others to be part of diaspora policies 6 . Lesińska (2013, 80-81) research-based answers in relation to migration policies at origin, whether this refers to emigration, diaspora or return migration policies.
Our aim here is mainly to address the second-last and (in part) the last of the questions mentioned above. Previous answers seem to be very scarce:
we were able to identify only one study driven by relatively similar questions. Tai and Truex (2015) worked with both quantitative and qualitative data to investigate the attitudes of Chinese citizens towards return migration. The returnees of interest for them were highly skilled (students, professors and entrepreneurs). The results, based on a survey experiment (web samples) and face-to-face interviews (urban areas), showed a relatively high level of support for return migration policies aiming to attract/integrate highly skilled returnees. However, this support depended on the socio-economic status of the respondents; it was fragmented against the quantity of benefits intended to stimulate the return of migrants and the category of beneficiaries.
The interventions targeting professors and entrepreneurs gained more support than those targeting students. Support for policies based on incentives decreased as the incentives increased, and the lower socioeconomic strata of the population seemed to be less likely to support such interventions. Inspired by theoretical models used to explain attitudes towards immigrants/immigration policies, the two authors hypothesised (and their results support the assumptions) that explanations for those attitudes were found in the perceived societal gains associated with return (this explains the lower level of support for students when compared with support for professors and entrepreneurs) and in the inequality aversion, referring "both to citizens' antipathy towards economic inequality and disparities in income distribution, as well as antipathy towards unequal and unfair policies in general" (Tai and Truex 2015, 774) . as beneficial and partially to explore the factors behind our informants' choices of whether or not to support return migration policies in Romania.
Using information only from young returnees limits the scope of our conclusions. We started from the assumption that because they are possible beneficiaries of such policies and are more empathetic with the return process, returnees themselves would have a more positive stance towards migration policies than towards other categories within the general Romanian population.
Romanian context
Romania is currently one of the most important origin countries of Europe.
According to World Bank (WB) data, in 2013, more than 3.4 million Romanians were living abroad. At the time, this was more than 17% of the country's population (World Bank 2016). Yet, the striking characteristic of Romanian migration lies not in the overall number of migrants, but in the huge increase in such a relatively short period of time, basically since the beginning of the new millennium (Sandu, 2010) . Previous to that moment, Romania, a national state since 1918, had not had a consistent history of migration. Transylvania, one of the historical provinces, had been the source of some migration to the United States at the end of nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries. After the Second World War, more than 50 years of communist rule gradually transformed the country into one of the most closed societies of the former communist bloc. Ethnic return migrations (Brubaker 1998) to Israel, Germany and, to a lesser extent, Hungary were the most consistent international movements across borders (Șerban 2011). The fall of the communist regime at the end of 1989 was followed by an explosion of departures abroad. After few years, the restrictions introduced by destination countries considerably slowed the pace of emigration. In the mid- Romanians, migration increased spectacularly. Shortly after this, Italy and Spain become the main migration destinations. These trends continued for a couple of years (Sandu 2010 with Italy, Spain, Germany, the UK and France on the list of the most important destinations. Romania's achievement of full membership in the EU transformed Romanian migration into a highly complex and fluid phenomenon. Temporary and circular as well as permanent forms mixed together, resulting in a highly dynamic migration.
As labour migration increased, the flow of remittances grew substantially; the maximum point was reached in 2008 (more than 9 billion dollars in the estimation of the WB). Once the economic crisis set in, the remittances fell by almost a half, and since then, the trend has decreased. Even It is difficult to assess the degree of public consultation related to migration policy in Romania. Some of the legal measures, especially those related to emigration, were very rapidly adopted and implemented. Their link with accession to the EU, a process largely supported by the Romanian population (Sandu 2008) , made the strategy of taking decisions "behind closed doors" sustainable. If we take the parliamentary debates as an indicator, then diaspora-related interventions were the most controversial.
Yet, this can be misleading: most of the debates were related to the sensitive topic of historical ethnic minorities living in neighbouring countries, not to the new diaspora, which was the result of post-1989 migration. Even though, as previously mentioned, topics related to migration and diaspora erupt periodically in public debates (especially during elections), we would rather characterise Romanian migration policy as uninformed by the opinions of the general population. In this context, our analysis provides a starting point for discussing the topic of public support and the potential for these policies, once adopted, to create social tensions.
Methodology
This paper is framed by the general methodological outline of the Horizon 2020 research project YMOBILITY. Our approach is built on a sample of 120 in-depth interviews conducted with Romanian young returnees. The term "returnee" is used here in a very specific way and designates only young involvement in programmes linked to these types of policies and their opinions about initiatives or ideas to support return migrants.
The entire sample of interviews was transcribed verbatim and a specialised qualitative software (NVivo 11) was used for a first exploratory analysis of the interviews. The codifying procedure allowed us to identify all the paragraphs related to policies for returnees and to include them in the analyses presented in this paper. Through a careful analysis of the qualitative evidence, we built a typology of returnees' attitudes towards origin country's policies on return migration; each category of attitudes is detailed in the next section.
On the one hand, some of the main limits of this methodological approach are in direct relation to the selection procedure, which combined snowball sampling through the researchers' social and professional networks and contacting potential informants via online social networks (e.g.
LinkedIn). On the other hand, all these selection strategies assured a highly heterogenous sample that was balanced in terms of gender, education and region of residence.
Are return migration policies desirable for Romania?
In this section, we investigate the young returnees' opinions related to the need for return migration policies in Romania. We began our analysis with the expectation of finding a high level of support for return migration policies. implementing return migration policies in Romania was actually disputed.
Though many of the interviewees believed that Romania needed policies to encourage return and support returnees, some of them thought these policies needed to be developed only under specific conditions. And there were informants who definitely rejected the idea.
Many of our interviewees supported return migration policies in general. They were favourable to interventions that addressed all returnees, irrespective of their characteristics. Some of the informants thought in terms of return migration, rather than migration, and associated it with a kind of return to "normality". This stance seems to stem from a negative evaluation of migration as a symptom of the dysfunctions of Romanian society in general, 10 rather than from a positive evaluation of return. Migration was perceived as a factor producing disequilibrium that is naturally compensated by return. As one of our migrants put it, Romania is the home of migrants In some other cases, the support for return migration policies reflected a lack of interest in the issue (answers of the type "why not?") rather than a strong opinion. This was confirmed by the inability to further develop (or exemplify) the content of return migration policies or to argument their opinion.
Though the majority of our informants considered migration policies to be necessary, some of them doubted their usefulness if (potential) beneficiaries included the entire population of (would-be) returnees. There were different types of reasoning behind these positions. The first type of Social Change Review ▪ Winter 2018 ▪ Vol. 16(1-2): 9-34 reasoning considered the anticipated effectiveness of such policies and advocated targeting policies by excluding would-be beneficiaries who had a low chance of returning. In this rationale, the probability of return is adversely related to the success of integration at destination, or, to put it otherwise, only those who do not really integrate return to their country of origin. One of our informants, a highly educated returnee from Germany (female, 31 years old)
illustrated this way of thinking. She distinguished between those migrating for "economic" reasons and those migrating for "professional" reasons (the distinction partially overlaps with low-skilled/highly skilled migration, but also referred to economic migration/migration driven by self-fulfilment reasons). For those in the first category, the intervention, in her opinion, would be beneficial and would have a chance of success. For those in the second, no intervention would be desirable as the chance of success would be basically non-existent. A second type of reasoning linked return migration policies with the benefits/contributions that returnees would bring to the development of their country of origin (Romania, in this case). In this perspective, policies should be designed according to the (current) needs of Romania and would-be returnees are conceived rather as a pool from which to select those with the desired characteristics. Generally, the interviewees adopting this stance referred to highly skilled migrants (e.g. physicians), but the level of education was not the main criterion for operating distinctions.
The level of skills seemed to be more important than the educational achievements (construction workers are also mentioned as one possible target group of return migration policies). Finally, a third type of reasoning made a connection between the needs of those who return and return migration policies. In this perspective, the need for help with integration in the origin society was dependent on the time spent abroad and the place where the migrant was educated (origin or destination country). Individuals who spent a long period of time abroad (10-15 years) or those who were educated abroad seemed to be perceived as less prepared for return and in need of help to readapt at home. If some of our informants associate return migration policies with (unneeded) positive discrimination, others consider that if the aim of these policies is to stimulate the migrants' return, then they are not necessary in the case of Romania. In their view, return migration is a matter of the development of the origin country, and it will naturally emerge as Romania develops:
R: There is no need to help someone to come home. Because they come voluntarily. The main thing is to organise the country so that it works. As long as you offer a matrix, a space in which one can live and develop and have a life ... they will come voluntarily. (male, 32 years old, returnee from the U.K.)
Though most of the arguments went in the direction that returnees are a category belonging to the general Romanian population once they return and should be treated in the same way as the others, other informants believed that support was effectively not needed, as migrants had already experienced a similar and even more complex process of adaptation (integration) in the destination country.
R: But they have no reason to support you in the end. You are coming back to your country from a place that, if we take what the people say, is more civilised. It is like they are trying to help you to adapt to worse conditions, and this seems to me ... this seems offensive to me. (male, 26 years old, returnee from the U.K.)
What kind of support measures should Romanian return migration policies include?
In this section we move the analysis further in the direction of concrete interventions that our interviewees think were appropriate in the case of Romania.
Most of those who agreed with the idea of return migration policies provided information about the interventions they perceived to be needed. In most cases, the interviewees mentioned at least one type of intervention, but Social Change Review ▪ Winter 2018 ▪ Vol. 16(1-2): 9-34 there were also returnees who elaborated pretty coherent plans for support.
We concentrate our attention here on identifying types of interventions, paying less attention to if and how the interviewees articulated them as part of larger, more coherent constructions. 11
As can easily be anticipated, the answers were diverse. However, only some of them were effectively related to return. As expected, some of the informants discussed more general policies that had a larger scope and were aimed more at the development of Romania. We have chosen to present/discuss only those answers specifically targeting the group of returnees.
Most of our interviewees suggested that creating/facilitating access to a job was the most needed support. Yet, access to a job was not considered sufficient enough. The main problem upon return is not finding a job per se, but finding a job that provides a decent income. This is perceived as particularly difficult for returnees, who have been used to consistently earning higher wages in the destination countries. The salary is not the only discouraging characteristic of the jobs available in Romania. Other issues, such as requiring few qualifications, offering unstable situations or those located in small companies, were also mentioned as problematic. Therefore, support measures should be directed not only to help returnees find a job but to find a job with certain characteristics and within a relatively short time upon return. Our informants suggested some solutions to this problem too: to negotiate with big companies and convince them to allocate a quota (e.g. 10%)
of the available positions to returnees; to offer fiscal incentives to companies hiring returnees; to exempt returnees from taxes and fees (e.g. as in the case of other categories of employees, such as IT specialists).
Helping returnees to find a job was not the only suggested intervention.
Financial assistance (in the form of a one-off payment or, in a similar manner, to offer social assistance benefits) was considered helpful upon return as it could assist with finding/renting a house. 11 As expected, only very few interviewees imagined very elaborate policy scenarios. Supporting the returnees to invest their money earned abroad was a recurrent theme of the analysed answers. Tax exemption seemed to be the most popular intervention. Some of the interviewees elaborated on this, suggesting that facilities for business investments would not bring consistent benefits to Romania if they were not directed towards specific types of investment (discouraging investment in small businesses such as shops and restaurants because there is a risk in "rubble", as one of interviewees put it, was one of the examples). Connected with this area of intervention was the idea of reducing the costs of transportation between origin and destination countries. In our interviewees' opinions, this would allow migrants to continue working abroad while supervising possible investments/businesses in the origin country.
Though the above-mentioned types of interventions were largely supported by our informants, others were mentioned in just a few cases, such as the following: providing benefits for the children of returnees; supporting the return of (at least) one parent in the case of couples who had left their children behind; providing help to the children of returnees to adapt to the
Romanian education system; providing information about Romania.
We need return migration policies -but their chance of being effective is very low
When discussing return migration policies, most of our interviewees seemed to be sceptical about their effectiveness (in general and/or in the case of Romania When considering the first perspective, the reasons behind the scepticism can be evaluated as mostly based on intrinsic factors associated with our informants' perceptions of the process of migration per se. One of these factors is integration at the destination and the inertia or the ordinariness of living in one (destination) country. This factor is particularly associated with long-term and family migration. Even though return seems to be perceived as a phenomenon that is difficult to influence, in our informants' discourse, there were also factors associated with the Romanian situation which seriously impinge on the success of return migration policies and these are mostly related to trust.
There is a real lack of trust that return migration policies would genuinely aim to stimulate return migration. As one of our interviewees pointed out, it is 
Discussion
Our expectation of finding a strong support for return migration policies among young returnees remains unconfirmed. This may suggest that, in the case of Romania, these policies have the potential of being a controversial issue. Based on our data, we have identified three types of attitudes towards return migration policies. First, there is what can be labelled as general support. This is mainly based on the interpretation of return migration as a concept that is in opposition to migration. In this view, migration is an indicator of problems associated with one country. In this discourse, the origin country becomes the home country, and returning home is definitely a good thing. Given the general arguments behind this attitude, we doubt that this kind of general support will continue if confronted with concrete plans for intervention.
The second type of attitude supports only targeted interventions. The categories of (potential) beneficiaries are defined by different criteria (exclusion or inclusion) and consider the (anticipated) efficiency of such policies, the returnees' needs and the needs of the origin country (mostly defined in relation to the labour market).
Finally, the third type of attitude rejects any type of intervention aimed at supporting the returnees. This seems to be based on a lack of recognition of the returnees as a distinct social group with specific needs, and it also seems to be based on the conviction that migration is directly linked to development.
Once the society reaches a certain level of development, migration genuinely stops and return migration increases.
The proposed typology can be a useful tool for understanding the variety of opinions about the role of the state in the process of return migration. One can also expect to find heterogeneity within the general population of an origin country and that support for implementing return migration policy will be limited to a specific category of people. In other words, there does not seem to be general support for attracting natives back to the origin country through policies financed by the state.
Our attempt to investigate the kinds of measures that should be included in return migration policies points to several major lines of intervention: those that target jobs, entrepreneurial behaviours and the children of returnees.
The success of return migration policies is perceived mainly in quantitative terms (i.e. the number of those who return) and, generally, the interventions are associated with a limited chance of success. The main causes seem to be certain objective factors associated with international migration/Romanian international migration but, most importantly, with the lack of trust in the capacity of Romanian authorities to implement such policies.
Our preliminary conclusions show limited agreement with previous work in the field (Tai and Truex 2015) . In our evaluation, return migration policies have the potential to be very controversial. This potential may be reduced by targeting the interventions. 12 Differing again with the results of the study of Tai and Truex, our analysis shows that the main factor driving the scepticism in relation to return migration policies is a lack of trust in the authorities of the origin country rather than concerns with social inequality.
However, the results should be accepted with caution, as they are limited to a very specific context (Romania) and confined to the very specific category of young returnees.
